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Preface
The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is without a doubt one of the most complex bilateral 
relationships in the world. As we finalize this report in May of 2011, the continuing 
fallout from the killing of Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani garrison town has 
prompted a reassessment of all facets of this uneasy alliance, both in Islamabad and 
in Washington. In this report, we address in detail one piece of the puzzle: the aid, 
trade, and investment policies that constitute America’s plan to support Pakistan’s 
development. 
Intrigued and more than a little alarmed by the way American development 
policy had become entangled with diplomacy and defense policies in Pakistan, I 
convened this study group in early 2010. Since its inception, the Center for Global 
Development has been concerned with how the United States can use its signifi-
cant resources and its leading role on the international stage most effectively, both 
for the world’s poor and for Americans’ own prosperity and security. My intention 
was for this study group to participate in the broader discussions about U.S. policy 
that were already at full roar, but to do so from a different starting point than most 
others. We have approached the big strategic questions of American interests and 
American power in Pakistan through the lens of long-term development, and in 
this report we dive more deeply than has been done before into the question of 
what assistance to Pakistan can accomplish and how it can be done well.
Who should read this report? Most obviously, it is intended for those in the halls 
of Congress and in the Obama administration who are grappling with the thorny 
decisions of how to secure American interests in Pakistan and spend taxpayer 
resources most effectively. We also hope it will be useful to those in the White 
House and State Department thinking about how aid and other development poli-
cies are best deployed in countries of strategic importance to the United States. In 
the democratizing Middle East and in other states central to U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts, the issues at the heart of the Pakistan development challenge are likely to 
play out again. Finally, we hope this report will inform those looking at the broader 
issues of how the United States deploys its civilian power to handle the develop-
ment challenges that have moved from the periphery to the center of foreign 
policy in this century. The ways in which questions of bureaucratic structure affect 
the coherence and effectiveness of U.S. development and diplomacy are on full 
display in Pakistan. While we recommend some fixes for this specific development 
program, they do not reduce the need for development to take on a more promi-
nent role in the broader U.S. foreign policy apparatus.
It is clear that promoting development in Pakistan has been and remains hard. 
We have attempted to address today’s challenges and to understand the strategic 
context in which U.S. policymakers operate. We also, however, have sought to 
arrive at conclusions that will stand the test of time. The U.S.-Pakistan relation-
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ship will remain critically important for decades, and there will be other Pakistans. 
Understanding what has gone on during the last two years in Pakistan will help 
future policymakers have a slightly easier time than their colleagues do today. This 
report is a roadmap for what to do in one country at one point in time, but also a 
compass to steer the United States toward a future in which American soft power 
matches the problems it will be asked to solve.
Nancy Birdsall 
President of the Center for Global Development 
Chair of the Study Group on a U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan
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1Executive Summary
Pakistan’s development and prosperity matter to the United States. Instability in 
Pakistan is both an immediate and long-term threat to Americans’ security. That 
is no more or less true after the revelation that Osama bin Laden was hiding out 
less than two hours’ drive from Pakistan’s capital city. The Obama administration 
and Congress recognize that physical insecurity is closely related to economic 
and political instability. Since 2009, they have ramped up support for long-term 
development as part of a new approach to engage with Pakistan. In this report 
we discuss why support for Pakistan’s long-term development makes sense; how 
to improve the planning and implementation of the U.S. development program, 
which is not yet on a clear or steady course; and what substantive elements could 
contribute to a strong U.S. development strategy in Pakistan.
Why and why now
It is in the interest of the United States to minimize the risk that the nuclear-
armed Pakistani state will fail. Weak political institutions, lackluster growth, poor 
education and job opportunities for a huge and growing youth population, and a 
profound sense of injustice among the Pakistani people put at risk the legitimacy 
of the democratic government and undermine its ability to combat extremism and 
terrorism. At the same time, Pakistan is not Yemen or Somalia; from a develop-
ment perspective, it is not Afghanistan either. Pakistan has a large middle class, 
an active and engaged civil society, a free press, and a fledgling civilian govern-
ment that is making some progress strengthening democratic institutions. The 
U.S. interest in Pakistan justifies a reasonable effort to help that country exploit its 
economic and social assets to build a capable, democratic state.
How 
After two years, the new U.S. approach cannot yet boast a coherent set of focused 
development priorities or the organization and tools to manage and adjust those 
priorities as conditions require. The integration of development into the “Af-Pak” 
bureaucratic structure has undermined the needed focus at the highest level on 
the development program and has blurred lines of authority and accountability 
for both planning and implementation. Transparency has not been a priority, and 
the lack of clear information generates skepticism and mistrust in Pakistan. The 
USAID mission is neither empowered nor equipped to succeed. The focus on 
the dollar size of the aid program has raised expectations in Pakistan and created 
unreasonable pressure in Washington to spend quickly.
We urge administration officials and Congress to display humility, patience, and 
clarity of mission, and we make five procedural recommendations to get the U.S. 
development program on track:
21. Clarify the mission: separate the Pakistan development program from the 
Afghanistan program and from the Pakistan security program. 
2. Name a leader: put one person in charge of the development program in 
Washington and in Islamabad.
3. Say what you are doing: set up a website with regularly updated data on 
U.S. aid commitments and disbursements in Pakistan by project, place, and 
recipient.
4. Staff the USAID mission for success: allow for greater staff continuity, carve 
out a greater role for program staff in policy dialogue, and hire senior-level 
Pakistani leadership.
5. Measure what matters: track not just the outputs of U.S. aid projects but 
Pakistan’s overall development progress.
What 
The ingredients of success in Pakistan are threefold: a stable and capable state 
able to deliver justice and meet the basic needs of its citizens, a strong private 
sector able to provide jobs to Pakistan’s growing population and revenues to the 
government, and a healthy civil society able to play its rightful role in the demo-
cratic process. These three ingredients are what Pakistan needs to achieve the 
fundamental goal of development—the slow, painstaking transformation of poorly 
functioning states and societies into ones that function well.  
Ultimately, Pakistanis themselves must lead this process of transformation. 
However, the United States’ development toolkit—aid as well as trade and 
investment policy—can help. Because aid is so difficult to do well, our first two 
recommendations underscore the importance of trade and investment, the tools 
with which the United States can support job creation and private-sector growth.
1. Let Pakistani products compete in U.S. markets. As part of an overall plan 
to spur private investment and job creation in Pakistan, we urge Congress 
and the administration to work together to extend duty-free, quota-free 
access to U.S. markets for all Pakistani exports from all of Pakistan for at 
least the next five years. 
2. Actively encourage domestic and foreign private investment. Increase 
the credit subsidy funding available for the Overseas Private Investment 
Company (OPIC) to offer new forms of risk insurance and extend credit to 
small and medium enterprises in Pakistan. Establish a Pakistani-American 
Enterprise Fund with an independent board to provide financial and tech-
nical assistance to private firms in Pakistan.
3And what about aid? We recognize that if Pakistan were an equally poor but less 
strategically important country, far less aid and attention would be devoted to 
supporting its development. Aid is not easy to do well in Pakistan, and done badly 
it could be counterproductive. But while aid should be only one part of any U.S. 
development strategy, it is worth getting it right in Pakistan because Pakistan’s 
future prosperity and stability matter for Americans’ own security. To withdraw aid 
now has its own cost; it would undermine in many Pakistanis’ eyes the legitimacy 
of their fragile democratic system, and it would deepen their sense that America’s 
single motive for any kind of assistance or engagement is to forestall its own imme-
diate security risks. America can and should be more far-sighted.
Our three recommendations on the aid front take into account the difficult nature 
of the challenges, and the inherent risks involved:
3. Beware the unintended consequences of aid. U.S. officials responsible for 
carrying out the development program should resist pressures to spend aid 
money too quickly. Especially in Pakistan’s volatile tribal areas, too much 
aid can be counterproductive to U.S. goals. Congress must appropriate aid 
each year, but it should do so with minimal pressure to disburse a certain 
amount within a year. We suggest how. 
4. Finance what is working. The United States should cofinance education 
programs initiated by other donors that are already working at the provin-
cial level. In the health, agriculture, and energy sectors, it should disburse 
more of its aid dollars on the basis of independently verified annual prog-
ress on outcome indicators such as reductions in maternal mortality or 
improvements in children’s learning. 
5. Support and engage with Pakistan’s reformers. There are already dedicated 
and capable constituencies in Pakistan—in government, in the business 
community, in civil-society organizations—advocating for necessary 
economic and political reforms. The United States should help these stake-
holders get seats at the appropriate bargaining tables. It should also support 
small-scale improvements to the machinery of democracy that could bolster 
the reform effort. 
On the basis of these recommendations, we offer a possible portfolio of good 
investments (outlined on page 35) that take advantage of U.S. comparative advan-
tages and balance the United States’ various long-term objectives in Pakistan.
4I.  Why: The Case for a U.S. 
Development Strategy 
In March of 2009, the Obama administration announced a comprehensive 
new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Explaining that a “campaign against 
extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone,” President Obama 
pledged significant increases in civilian efforts in both countries and declared 
supporting “a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of 
Pakistan” and a “stable constitutional government” to be central objectives of U.S. 
policy.1 Congress endorsed this new approach. In May 2009, Senators John Kerry 
and Richard Lugar and Representative Howard Berman introduced the Enhanced 
Partnership for Pakistan Act, now better known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. 
Signed into law in October 2009, the legislation authorized a tripling of economic 
assistance to Pakistan to a total of $7.5 billion over five years (with the possibility 
of a five-year extension).
Two years later, the U.S. development program in Pakistan is not yet on course. 
There has been little serious attention paid to the potential for U.S. trade and 
investment policy to spur growth and create jobs in Pakistan. Meanwhile, the aid 
program has not yet delivered. Observers in Pakistan and in Washington identify 
the same set of weaknesses in its design and implementation. No one is sure what 
the United States is trying to accomplish in the development space. Because of a 
debilitating lack of transparency in the aid program, no one is even sure what the 
United States is doing. With an approach to foreign policy in Washington that 
emphasizes integrating development and diplomacy, lines of authority over plan-
ning and implementing development policy are blurred. Long-term and short-term 
objectives compete for the same resources, and suspicion abounds in Pakistan that 
the United States’ aid spending is driven more by security concerns and objec-
tives than by development best practice. On the ground in Pakistan, an aid mission 
already asked to instantly scale up its operations is hampered by shifting (and 
often conflicting) instructions from Washington and by burdensome oversight and 
bureaucracy that limit flexibility, innovation, and risk taking. 
To be sure, Pakistan is and has been a difficult place for external supporters to 
make a difference. The same concerns over security and political fragility that 
justify the deployment of development aid dollars from the United States and 
other countries also complicate the effectiveness of aid spending. On trade, 
Pakistan is no worse off than many other developing countries in its poor access 
to U.S. markets for key products, and no amount of U.S. investment can fully 
1. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” March 27, 
2009, www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for 
-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/.
Two years later, the 
U.S. development 
program in Pakistan 
is not yet on course. 
5compensate for Pakistan’s overall weak investment climate at the moment. Still, the 
bottom line is that the U.S. development program is far from realizing its potential. 
Now, however, with new leadership in place in Washington and Pakistan and a lot 
of hard work completed in establishing the systems for implementing a new busi-
ness model of delivering aid, the United States has an opportunity to do better. 
This report lays out why a development-focused U.S. development strategy in 
Pakistan is a smart strategic choice for the United States, what such a strategy 
might look like, and how it could be administered. 
Why development in Pakistan matters to the United 
States
The underlying premise of the United States’ renewed focus on economic and 
political development in Pakistan makes sense. A weak state, lackluster growth, 
and a profound sense of injustice among the people of Pakistan put at risk the 
legitimacy of the democratic government and undermine its ability to combat 
extremism and terrorism. Insecurity in Pakistan is a critical threat to the safety and 
“This bill is not a short-term fix: it aims for the medium term, and especially for 
the long term.” 
—Senator John Kerry, 2009 floor statement introducing the Kerry-
Lugar-Berman bill
“If Pakistan is to break its debilitating cycle of instability, it will need to achieve 
progress on fighting corruption, delivering government services, and promoting 
broad-based economic growth. The . . . United States should support reforms 
that contribute to the strengthening of Pakistani civilian institutions.” 
—Senator Richard Lugar, 2009 floor statement
“Achieving our core goal . . . requires, first of all, realistic and achievable objec-
tives. These include: Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable 
constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides 
opportunity for the people of Pakistan.” 
—White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy 
toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 2009
“[A]id alone is not development. Development is helping nations to actually 
develop—moving from poverty to prosperity. And we need more than just aid 
to unleash that change. We need to harness all the tools at our disposal—from 
our diplomacy to our trade policies to our investment policies.
—President Barack Obama, 2010 speech at the Millennium 
Development Goals Summit
Now, however, the 
United States has an 
opportunity to do 
better. 
6security of Americans and the stability of South Asia as a whole.2 According to one 
recent report, more than half of the 21 serious terrorist plots against the West since 
2004 had ties to Pakistan’s tribal regions, areas President Obama has termed “the 
most dangerous place in the world for Americans.”3 Internal threats to the Pakistani 
state are increasing—and are themselves global threats given Pakistan’s arsenal of 
over 100 nuclear weapons, its worrisome history of proliferation, and its precari-
ously balanced relationship with neighboring India.
Fundamentally, as American leaders have recognized, the key to securing U.S. inter-
ests in Pakistan is to address not only physical security but also Pakistan’s political 
and economic weaknesses. Indeed, these three dimensions of insecurity—military, 
political, and economic—are mutually reinforcing in Pakistan, each feeding the 
others in a destructive cycle.
Economic trends are increasing pressures on Pakistan’s already weakened social 
fabric. There are as many Pakistanis under the age of 25 today as there are people 
in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia combined. By 2030, Pakistan will have the fourth 
largest population of any country in the world. The millions of young Pakistanis 
who enter the work force each year are poorly prepared to find well-paying, skilled 
jobs.4 Pakistan’s education system has failed most of them: for every 100 students 
who enter kindergarten in Karachi, only one graduates from the city’s secondary 
schools.5 Economic growth would have to exceed 8 percent per year simply to 
create jobs for Pakistan’s rising population.6 It has instead slowed, and high fiscal 
deficits are generating inflation at levels that are worrying. A severe power crisis 
limits growth and investment, with unpredictable outages lasting up to 18 hours 
a day. Inefficient water use and the growing population continue to deplete ever-
2. For a broader argument on how American security and prosperity depend increasingly on its global 
environment, see Mr. Y [Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby], “A National Strategic Narrative,” (Washington: 
Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011), www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/A%20National%20Strategic%20
Narrative.pdf. 
3. Paul Cruickshank, “The Militant Pipeline: Between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the 
West,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper (Washington: New America Foundation, 2011), avail-
able at  http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/publications/policy/the_militant_pipeline. 
4. According to the latest economic survey, the Pakistani working age population will not peak until 2045, 
when 68 percent of Pakistanis will be of working age. See Nausheen Saba Nizami, “Population, Labor Force and 
Employment,” chapter 16 in Pakistan Economic Survey 2009–10 (Government of Pakistan Ministry of Finance, 
2010),  www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_10/16_Population.pdf. 
5. Sir Michael Barber, “Education Reform in Pakistan: This Time It’s Going to Be Different” (Pakistan 
Education Task Force, 2010), www.pakistaneducationtaskforce.com/web_urdu/erp.pdf.
6. This figure has been widely cited and seemingly originates in analysis performed by the Planning 
Commission of the Government of Pakistan. See the draft of “Pakistan: New Growth Framework” 
(Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, 2011), available online at www.planningcommission.gov.pk/
nda/PDFs/conceptual_framework_2.pdf. 
The key to securing 
U.S. interests in 
Pakistan is to 
address not only 
physical security 
but also Pakistan’s 
political and economic 
weaknesses.
7shrinking supplies of fresh water, threatening the agricultural backbone of the 
country.
None of these problems—in the power, education, and water sectors, or on the 
fiscal front—will be resolved unless Pakistan’s political institutions and leaders 
can tackle them head on. At the present moment, the political economy of policy 
reform in Pakistan and structural features in the Pakistani system of government 
make that difficult if not impossible. A weak coalition government headed by the 
Pakistan Peoples Party finds its parliamentary majority thrown into doubt when-
ever it hints at economic reform. Top-down efforts to reduce costly, untargeted 
energy and other subsidies are met with street protests. Political leaders who 
support tolerance and moderation have been assassinated. Given the way power 
is divided among regional parties and between the federal and provincial govern-
ments, it is hard to see how any other coalition would fare better. Although a broad 
constituency for reform exists, it presently has no effective political channels to 
exercise its influence. 
Mutually reinforcing security, economic, and political weaknesses deeply frustrate 
Pakistanis. In a Pew opinion poll, 91 percent of Pakistanis said the lack of jobs was 
a key concern, tied with terrorism as the top concern.7 Only 14 percent expressed 
satisfaction with national conditions, more than 75 percent feel the economy is in 
bad shape, and half think it will worsen over the next year. Pakistan’s own govern-
ment is nearly as unpopular among its own people as the United States is. Just 20 
percent of Pakistanis view President Asif Zardari favorably, and only a quarter feel 
that the national government has a positive influence on the way things are going 
(compared to 84 percent for the military). 
Pakistan differs from Egypt or Libya in early 2011 in that it is ruled by a democrati-
cally elected government, not a military strongman. At the same time, Pakistan’s 
democracy is fragile, and recent events in the Middle East indicate the insecurity 
and volatility that could result if the pressures created by Pakistan’s young frus-
trated population and its economic and political weaknesses are not relieved. 
Slowly settling the combustible mix of instabilities in Pakistan and laying the foun-
dation for a more prosperous, functional country over the long term is the best way 
for Pakistanis and Americans to support their future security.
The ingredients of success in Pakistan are threefold: a stable and capable state 
able to deliver justice and meet the basic needs of its citizens, a strong private 
sector able to provide jobs to Pakistan’s growing population and revenues to the 
government, and a healthy civil society able to play its rightful role in the demo-
cratic process. These three ingredients are what Pakistan needs to achieve the 
fundamental goal of development—the slow, painstaking transformation of poorly 
7. “Concern about Extremist Threat Slips in Pakistan,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 29, 2010, http://
pewglobal.org/2010/07/29/concern-about-extremist-threat-slips-in-pakistan/1/.
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8functioning states and societies into ones that function well. Ultimately, this is a 
process that Pakistan has to lead. No matter what Pakistan’s international donors 
do—or how much aid money they spend—it is Pakistan’s own political leaders and 
citizens who will determine whether their country succeeds. 
Why the time is right in Pakistan
As this report goes to press, the prospects for a positive outcome in Pakistan—for 
Pakistanis or for Americans—seem bleak. The stories of the day include political 
assassinations, an increasing terrorist threat even in Pakistan’s major cities, and a 
U.S.-Pakistan relationship on the rocks following the killing of Osama bin Laden a 
stone’s throw away from Pakistan’s military academy. But just as there are reasons to 
believe the United States has a window available to reassess and improve its devel-
opment strategy, there are reasons to believe that Pakistan can turn the corner. 
Chief among them is the slow but meaningful progress Pakistan is making to 
entrench its democratic system of government. More than three years after a return 
to elected rule, Pakistan seems likely to make it to a second round of elections 
next year. The process of devolving powers and budgets to the provinces—though 
chaotic and inefficient in the short term—represents a necessary step toward 
strengthening the democratic system. This year’s national census, the first to be 
conducted in 13 years, and next year’s elections will likely reveal a population that 
has changed and is changing in important ways. An increasingly urban, increas-
ingly young population offers hope that the ossified, traditional power centers of 
Pakistani society may have competition. Meanwhile, what appears to be a good-
faith attempt to normalize relations across the Pakistan-India border is making 
progress, albeit fragile and reversible. 
Pakistan’s most important resource is its large, highly competent, and well-
educated middle class that can provide the drive for private-sector growth and 
policy reform. That group comprises millions of Pakistanis working in the media, 
academia, public service, and civil society organizations who are dedicated to the 
idea of a more just and democratic system.
How much is $1.5 billion a year in aid?
 — 5½ days of average U.S. military spending in Afghanistan 
 — less than 1 percent of Pakistan’s GDP and approximately 5 percent  of the 
federal government’s budget
 — half of USAID’s global health budget (not including State Department–ad-
ministered HIV/AIDS programs)
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9Nevertheless, Pakistan must make a significant course correction if it is to join the 
ranks of India, Indonesia, and other large Asian countries on a clear path of sustain-
able growth and transformation. The United States has a role to play in achieving 
that course correction, a correction that would ultimately benefit Americans as 
well. Without exaggerating the importance of U.S. money or diplomatic leverage, 
the United States should focus its development programs to support the many 
courageous Pakistanis working toward a better future for their own country. That is 
what will in turn help secure a safer future for Americans and the rest of the world.
Three foundational themes: humility, clarity of 
mission, patience
Commendably, American policymakers have expressed their intent to address all 
three of Pakistan’s instabilities—in the security, economic, and political spheres—
and to build on and support the small but hopeful changes underway in Pakistan. 
However, two years of a new, comprehensive approach have fallen short. This year, 
high-level staff changes and the largely invisible progress made developing working 
relationships with the Pakistani government present a window of opportunity to 
reassess and improve the U.S. development strategy in Pakistan. Here, we outline 
three themes that we believe should constitute a foundation on which to build a 
better U.S. program: humility, clarity of mission, and patience.
First, Pakistan’s development challenge demands a great deal of humility from the 
United States and other supporters. Since 1960, all OECD and multilateral credi-
tors have given an inflation-adjusted total of over $100 billion in development 
assistance to Pakistan.8 That money has built dams, roads, and schools, has trained 
teachers, farmers, and nurses, but it has failed to secure the fundamental economic 
and political reforms that would foster self-sustaining progress. The lesson is about 
lack of leverage: aid has not and will not buy the United States or other outside 
supporters the ability to dictate the outcomes of Pakistan’s political process.9 In 
the case of the U.S. aid program, the $1.5 billion per year in pledged assistance is 
not an unprecedented aid investment in Pakistan—two multilateral donors have 
current programs that are larger. It is not a large sum when compared to the size of 
Pakistan’s economy or its population, translating to roughly $8 per Pakistani per 
year. In 2010, it would have constituted approximately 5 percent of total federal 
expenditures. And it is far less than the estimated $11 billion that Pakistanis will 
send home from abroad as remittances this fiscal year.10
8. OECD DAC-2a, ODA Disbursements from1960–2009 in constant 2008 dollars. To be more precise, the 
total recorded by the OECD is $101.4 billion.
9. See more on this point in Nancy Birdsall, Wren Elhai, and Molly Kinder, “Pakistan’s Political Crisis: The 
Limits of U.S. Leverage,” Foreign Policy’s Af Pak Channel, January 20, 2011, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/
posts/2011/01/20/pakistan_s_political_crisis_the_limits_of_us_leverage.  
10. “Pakistan’s July-April Current Account Surplus at $748 million,” The News, May 18, 2011, www.thenews.
com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=47490&Cat=3&dt=5/18/2011.  
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Second, the United States must give its development strategy a clear mission. The 
United States faces many competing pressures and urgent priorities in Pakistan. It 
is tempting for policymakers to look to the development strategy to pursue addi-
tional U.S. strategic objectives, often unrelated to the fundamental goal of state 
building and economic development. Some would like, for example, for the devel-
opment program to improve the public image of the United States in Pakistan or 
for it to secure the Pakistani government’s support for U.S. military policies. These 
additional layers of objectives muddle the development mission, imperil the effec-
tiveness of the aid dollars, and often result in the United States trying to do too 
much, too quickly, with little enduring impact. Some of these objectives, including 
the goal of winning “hearts and minds,” are beyond what is possible to achieve with 
a development program alone. We argue that the United States has to make choices 
about the primary goals of its policies. 
Finally, we urge patience and a tolerance for risk. Support for Pakistan’s develop-
ment is a low-cost, stunningly sensible addition to the United States’ portfolio 
of risk-reducing measures in Pakistan. The risks associated with an aid program 
are serious but small compared to the risks of military engagement overseas and 
counterterrorism at home. Development investments, like preventive health care, 
are less expensive and far less risky than dealing with emergencies later. However, 
such investments do take time and persistence to yield a return. Development does 
not happen overnight and often happens in fits and starts.11 Done well, the U.S. aid 
program can seed investments in people, institutions, and programs that have the 
potential to pay off over the long term. If long-term development is truly an impor-
tant goal, it must be protected from being crowded out by the short-term pressures 
often associated with the “integration” of development programs with diplomatic 
and security strategies. To the extent possible, the development program must be 
shock-proofed against the inevitable crises in the volatile U.S.-Pakistan diplomatic 
relationship—the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad being only the latest 
example.
11. An important lesson for U.S. policymakers is that some uncertainty will be a necessary and critical part 
of any path to long-term stability. See, for example Moeed Yusuf, “Useful Instability,” Dawn.com, January 31, 
2011, www.dawn.com/2011/01/31/useful-instability.html. 
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II. How: Two Years On, It Is Not 
Too Late
Since early 2009, those in charge of U.S. foreign policy have shaped a new approach 
to nonmilitary engagement with Pakistan. The U.S. Congress committed additional 
aid resources; the administration set up a special office in the State Department 
for Pakistan and Afghanistan; and its first head, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, 
instituted a major and welcome shift away from contract-managed aid toward more 
direct support of and partnership with the government of Pakistan. But after two 
years, the new approach cannot yet boast a coherent set of focused priorities, the 
tools to manage and adjust those priorities as conditions require, or a system to 
measure and report progress against them. 
Thankfully it is not too late. There are signs in Washington and Islamabad that 
elements of a better aid structure and a more focused strategy are starting to fall 
into place. Now is the time for the U.S.-Pakistani partnership to do better. 
Four problems 
Before turning to our recommendations to improve the planning and implementa-
tion of U.S. development policy in Pakistan, it is worth considering the reasons the 
program has yet to take off. We identify four such reasons.
1. The integrated “Af-Pak” approach has muddled the devel-
opment mission in Pakistan
Upon taking office, the Obama administration moved quickly to design a new 
institutional structure for an integrated approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
The so-called Af-Pak construct was inspired by what the Obama administration 
perceived to be an interconnected security threat stemming from the presence 
of Al-Qaeda in both countries and the central role Pakistan plays in resolution of 
Afghanistan war.12 The result was both a geographic integration (Afghanistan and 
Pakistan) and a functional integration across government agencies, which merged 
the development efforts for these two countries with the broader diplomatic and 
defense strategies. 
The “Af-Pak” strategy resulted in bureaucratic and functional changes and new 
coordinating roles in both Washington and Islamabad. In Washington, Ambassador 
Holbrooke became the first special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(SRAP), and built a dedicated team at the State Department comprising 
Afghanistan and Pakistan experts from across the U.S. government. USAID reorga-
12. The “Af-Pak” moniker has been dropped from official U.S. government lexicon, but the “Afghanistan-
Pakistan” grouping has persisted. 
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nized its own staff along similar lines, creating the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force, 
which later became the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. In Islamabad, 
the Obama administration created the senior-level position of coordinator for U.S. 
civilian assistance within the State Department, intended to complement the work 
of the ambassador and USAID mission director. Meanwhile, a Strategic Dialogue 
process was set in place, with periodic high-level meetings in Washington and 
Islamabad between Pakistani and U.S. officials. The U.S. representatives come 
from across the U.S. government. Among the U.S. leads on the economic working 
groups are a senior director at the National Security Council, the U.S. trade repre-
sentative, a deputy undersecretary of agriculture, and three undersecretaries of 
state.
From a development perspective, the creation of the SRAP office and the increased 
attention to Afghanistan and Pakistan have allowed for a few notable cross-border 
success stories, including the signing of a landmark trade and transit accord 
between the two countries in July 2010 and continued cooperation on immuniza-
tion campaigns. However, on balance, the integrated approach for both countries 
has not fostered an effective development program in Pakistan. 
There are at least three ways “Af-Pak” integration has undermined the development 
mission. First, in policy discussions in Washington, security and Afghanistan domi-
nate. In cases where portfolios span the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
the larger budgets and public attention paid to Afghanistan translate into greater 
amounts of staff time and high-level attention dedicated to that country —at times 
at the expense of attention to Pakistan. When Pakistan is addressed, security domi-
nates. Trade, investment, and aid lose out. 
Second, the integration of development, diplomacy, and defense has muddled the 
development mission and left the program without a clear, focused mandate. The 
Kerry-Lugar legislation lists no fewer than 11 different objectives of U.S. policy, 
including enhancing short-term stability, countering extremism, and improving 
the standing of the United States among Pakistanis. Non-aid tools are often over-
looked, and aid decisions are politicized and subject to short-term pressures. 
Overall, the program ends up trying to do too much, too quickly. Integration has 
made long-term development issues in Pakistan more susceptible to distraction by 
the security and diplomatic emergencies of the moment. For instance, in the after-
math of the Raymond Davis incident in Lahore, the U.S. government cancelled 
plans for a trilateral economic summit, and the press reported widespread rumors 
that a congressional delegation visiting Pakistan threatened to cut U.S. aid. 
Finally, the integrated structure has blurred lines of authority: it is unclear who is 
in charge of the development strategy in Washington and who is responsible for its 
implementation in Pakistan. In the field, the assistance coordinator shares respon-
sibilities in Islamabad with an ambassador and a USAID mission director, but their 
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roles are ambiguous. In Washington, there are many cooks in the kitchen but no 
one person in charge. 
2. In the absence of transparency, skepticism and mistrust of 
the aid program are widespread
A key motivation of the Enhanced Partnership legislation was to improve the rela-
tionship between the United States and the government and people of Pakistan 
and to reduce widespread mistrust and anti-American sentiment among Pakistani 
citizens. The bill’s authors explained that through the program the United States 
“can materially and powerfully demonstrate the true friendship of the American 
people for the Pakistani people.” Two years later, however, anti-American senti-
ment in Pakistan has only worsened. 
We doubt that the positive effects on public opinion of a well-executed develop-
ment program will ever outweigh the negative effects of the drone campaign and 
high-profile diplomatic disputes like those surrounding the Raymond Davis inci-
dent and the killing of Osama bin Laden. This is neither the point nor the potential 
of development assistance. However, whatever possible public diplomacy benefit 
could come from the program has been stymied by confusion about what it is 
trying to achieve and a mystifying lack of information on what has been done. 
The United States has placed a heavy emphasis on branding U.S.-funded projects 
a with the USAID logo, featuring the slogan “From the American People.” Yet 
the overall brand of the aid program itself is quite weak. The term “Kerry-Lugar-
Berman” is associated with little in Pakistan beyond the monetary value of the aid 
pledge—a dangerous state of affairs, as a monetary figure unsupported by a clear 
narrative is easy to construe as an attempt to purchase the cooperation of Pakistani 
leaders. Lists of U.S. aid priorities encompass broad categories such as economic 
growth, the social sectors, energy infrastructure, stability, and humanitarian assis-
tance. In aid as in life, if everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. 
Moreover, it remains difficult for us and for the Pakistani people to understand 
how these priority sectors translate into a concrete portfolio of individual proj-
ects. The most complete listing of USAID’s activities is to be found only in an 
auditor’s report, and it is not linked to from the USAID-Pakistan website.13 The 
administration’s assistance strategy in 2009 called for a portfolio of “high-impact, 
high-visibility” projects in targeted sectors, but none of these signature projects has 
gained traction in Pakistani public discourse—perhaps because even the signature 
programs are collections of relatively small-scale projects.14 
13. Government Accountability Office, “Department of State’s Report to Congress and U.S. Oversight of 
Civilian Assistance to Pakistan Can Be Further Enhanced” (GAO-11-310R) February 12, 2011, www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-11-310R. 
14. The lists of projects announced to be part of the signature programs in energy, water, and health are 
available on the USAID-Pakistan website at www.usaid.gov/pk/downloads/factsheets.html. The current status 
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Finally, at the most basic level, key audiences in Pakistan and the United States 
remain troublingly unaware of how much money has been spent and on what. 
It is not their fault. Even the auditors responsible for tracking aid spending have 
expressed deep frustration with the lack of data on the outputs of U.S.-funded aid 
projects in Pakistan.15 Basic data on how much aid has been disbursed is unavail-
able online; we obtained it only after several months of persistent requests.16 
In May 2010, Senator Kerry wrote a letter lamenting the lack of clear information 
on the U.S. aid package in Pakistan. “This creates confusion and unnecessary spec-
ulation in Pakistan,” Kerry wrote, “and limits the potential of the policy community 
and allies at home.”17 The current vacuum of information is an unforced error for 
the United States. Those who have concerns that transparency would worsen the 
reputation of the aid program miscalculate just how poorly the program is already 
perceived. In the absence of clearly presented, trusted information, speculation and 
conspiracy theories are already filling the vacuum. 
3. The USAID mission is neither empowered nor equipped to 
succeed
The USAID mission in Pakistan has been tasked with scaling up its operations to 
triple economic assistance while shifting to a new business model that emphasizes 
funding Pakistani institutions. However, the mission has been placed in a position 
that makes success improbable. Two constraints on the mission’s effectiveness are 
the short duration of staff postings (including the mission director) and the limits 
imposed on staff movements by security restrictions. American civilians are typi-
cally stationed in Pakistan for one-year posts split up by multiple R&R breaks. The 
brevity of staff tenure hinders the mission’s ability to establish lasting and mean-
ingful relationships with Pakistani partners—a key part of the new business model 
of working directly with the Pakistan government. The high level of U.S. staff turn-
over frustrates Pakistanis and fuels the perception of a start-and-stop approach to 
working with development partners.
of most of these projects is unclear.
15. “Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan as of 
December 31, 2010,” jointly prepared by the Inspectors General for USAID, the Department of State, and 
the Department of Defense, www.usaid.gov/oig/public/special_reports/pakistan_quarterly_report_as_of_
dec_31_2010.pdf. 
16. Disbursement figures at a level of detail to allow for a real understanding of the program are still unavail-
able. For more, see Wren Elhai, “Nailing Down the Slipper Numbers on U.S. Aid to Pakistan,” posted May 6, 
2011, on CGD’s Rethinking U.S. Foreign Assistance Blog, http://blogs.cgdev.org/mca-monitor/2011/05/
nailing-down-the-slippery-numbers-on-u-s-aid-to-pakistan.php. 
17. John Kerry, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations letter to Richard Holbrooke, special 
representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, May 25, 2010, available at www.boston.com/news/politics/politi-
calintelligence/Kerry%20Holbrooke%20re%20Pak%20assistance%20strategy.pdf.
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The muddled lines of authority described above further undermine the ability 
of mission staff to operate effectively. In contrast to counterparts from the UK 
and other donor missions, the structure of the U.S. bureaucracy largely separates 
program implementation from policy dialogue with the Pakistani government. 
Especially in the priority sectors of energy and water, the State Department 
handles policy while USAID designs and implements aid projects—with insuf-
ficient links between the two spheres. This dynamic diminishes the opportunities 
and incentives for USAID program staff to develop strong working relationships 
with counterparts in the recipient government, as they are expected to do in other 
field assignments. At the senior staffing level, other donors and government offi-
cials view the State Department’s coordinator for economic assistance (who has 
had ambassadorial rank) as senior to the USAID mission director. This perception 
may make it more difficult for USAID staff to interact as effectively as would be 
ideal with their government counterparts and with other donors.
Finally, demands from Washington impose a heavy burden on field staff. In its first 
18 months, the mission was buffeted by a constant stream of shifting and at times 
conflicting instructions. The Holbrooke-mandated effort to assess the potential of 
Pakistani institutions to implement selected programs, though welcome, absorbed 
considerable staff time. A response to the floods required reprogramming some 
existing programs and canceling others. Burdensome oversight and reporting 
requirements continue to limit the ability of staff to make decisions, take risks, and 
innovate. A June 2010 inspector general’s report found that “a significant portion” 
of the U.S. embassy in Islamabad’s limited resources were devoted to supporting 
nearly 700 official visitors from Congress and the administration. Their visits 
totaled 175 days during the 2009 fiscal year.18  Delays in Congress slow down an 
already complicated process of budgeting and spending aid, and the contentious 
fights over the broader foreign operations budget throw the U.S. commitment to 
Pakistan into doubt. 
4. The money is a problem
In October 2009, Congress authorized tripling U.S. development assistance to 
Pakistan, from approximately $500 million a year in 2008 to $1.5 billion per year 
for five years.19 This large figure, and the many public statements by U.S. officials 
that cite it as a symbol of America’s long-term commitment to Pakistan, have raised 
expectations in Pakistan and in the United States. Those expectations exceed 
the reality of American influence in Pakistan and the speed and scale of what the 
U.S. aid program could ever accomplish. Many Pakistanis assume the U.S. can 
exert seemingly limitless influence on the decisions and actions of their leaders. 
18. “Embassy Islamabad and Constituent Posts, Pakistan,” Report of Inspection (Department of State Office 
of Inspector General Report Number ISP-I-10-64, June 2010), http://oig.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/144568.pdf. 
19. See box in section I for a range of comparisons for the size of this aid package. Note: while Congress 
authorized up to $7.5 billion for five years, Congress must appropriate this money on an annual basis.
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In Washington, policymakers expect that the aid program can accomplish half a 
dozen or more objectives simultaneously, many of which are competing, and that 
money can be spent well, quickly, and accountably through an entirely new busi-
ness model. 
In the absence of an unambiguous objective or clear indicators of progress, atten-
tion in Pakistan and in the United States focuses on the pace of aid spending, 
which has been slow. USAID reports that it disbursed $275 million in the 2009 
fiscal year and $676 million in 2010, the first year covered by the Kerry-Lugar-
Berman commitment.20 The pace of spending has been slower than appropriations 
might have permitted (though in 2010 the new Kerry-Lugar-Berman money was 
not available until very late in the fiscal year) in part for good reasons that were not 
predictable, in part for entirely predictable reasons. 
A new business model that aims to spend approximately half of U.S. aid through 
Pakistani institutions, instead of through U.S. contractors, has simply taken time 
to get off the ground—an unavoidable trade-off of speed for the possibility of 
building local capacity.21 Significant time has been invested certifying Pakistani 
organizations that meet American accounting standards, training additional 
Pakistani auditors to evaluate U.S.-funded projects, and choosing projects in 
coordination with the Pakistani government. Because of fears of corruption, 
disbursing money through Pakistani government channels carries a greater admin-
istrative burden, especially as relationships are first being established.22 A rough 
count reveals at least a dozen separate documents—from congressional notifica-
tion to activity agreements to implementation letters—that must be prepared 
and approved before any money moves. Now that much of the groundwork has 
been laid, the pace of disbursement may increase—but, ideally, it will not exceed 
USAID’s ability to spend money well.
If slow spending allows for better-planned programs and greater impact, then 
slower disbursement is a good thing and the error was in creating expectations in 
Pakistan that the United States’ aid bureaucracy could move much more quickly 
than realistically possible. Indeed, spending quickly without lasting impact would 
20. USAID internal statistics. Disbursement numbers are extremely hard to come by and can be oddly 
uncertain. For example, while USAID reports disbursing $676 million in FY2010, only $180 million of that 
amount was drawn from appropriations against the Kerry-Lugar-Berman commitment. The remainder came 
from unspent prior year appropriations. 
21. The Pakistan aid program is at the vanguard of a new U.S. approach to interactions with aid recipient 
countries, encapsulated in the recently completed Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and in 
major procurement reforms across USAID that will permit a similar approach in other priority countries.
22. This is above and beyond an already severe administrative burden, described by former USAID 
Administrator Andrew Natsios. See Andrew Natsios, “The Clash of the Counter-bureaucracy and 
Development,” CGD Essay (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2010), www.cgdev.org/content/
publications/detail/1424271. 
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only confirm Pakistanis’ suspicions that the United States is not a credible long-
term partner, suspicions that are based in the history of American assistance to 
Pakistan. Since Pakistan’s founding, U.S. aid has surged during periods when 
Pakistan has occupied an important strategic position—periods that have coin-
cided with military rule in the country (see chart next page). Most recently, the 
United States reengaged with Pakistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. During 
the administration of George W. Bush, the United States provided large amounts 
of aid to Pakistan, the vast majority of which was military-focused; only about one-
quarter was allocated for nonmilitary purposes.23 
“In the past, security assistance always overshadowed development aid: the 
Pakistani military could bypass civilian authorities to focus policy on its institu-
tional interests,” the authors of the Kerry-Lugar legislation wrote in their summary. 
“Under Kerry-Lugar, economic assistance is no longer the poor cousin to military 
aid.”24 Yet in trying to prove this point, the United States’ aid package is trapped in 
an impossible trinity: Congress and the administration demand local ownership, 
rigorous oversight, and speedy results. Under current constraints, the aid program 
can maximize two of these at one time, but not all three. 
Five recommendations to get on track
To address the problems described above, we suggest the United States take the 
following steps. In brief, we recommend defining and communicating a clear set of 
objectives and giving USAID the responsibility and authority to deliver on them.
1. Clarify the mission: separate the Pakistan development 
program from the Afghanistan program and from the Pakistan 
security program 
We recommend that, wherever possible, a development strategy in Pakistan be 
planned and implemented independently from U.S. policy in Afghanistan. This 
could mean increasing the number of development professionals in USAID and 
the State Department who deal with only Pakistan. In the Office of the Special 
Representative, for instance, it is our understanding that every person who works 
on development issues splits time between Afghanistan and Pakistan and only one 
employee on the State Department’s Pakistan desk deals solely with economic 
assistance issues. At USAID, the Pakistan program needs the full-time attention of 
a leader in Washington with the experience in Pakistan and stature in Washington 
23. The Congressional Research Service estimates that the United States provided $12.1 billion in military 
and nonmilitary aid to Pakistan from 2002 to 2008. Of that, $3.2 billion was for economic and humanitarian 
purposes. See K. Alan Kronstadt, “Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002–
FY2011,” table prepared for the Congressional Research Service, available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.
pdf. 
24. See “Senate Unanimously Passes Kerry-Lugar Pakistan Aid Package,” press release of Senator Lugar, June 
25, 2009, http://lugar.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=315031&.
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to advocate for good development practice. It is unclear whether a deputy position 
to an Afghanistan-Pakistan office director (currently the most senior staff member 
solely responsible for Pakistan) can meet this requirement. 
While a two-country “Af-Pak” construct may make sense from a short-term 
security perspective, it makes much less sense from a development perspective. 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are at different points on the path of development and 
require different kinds of assistance delivered in different ways. The expertise and 
experience needed for U.S. staff to work on development issues in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan is different. The very missions in each country are different. Short-
term stabilization is the top priority in Afghanistan; long-term development is and 
should be the priority in Pakistan. Assigning staff to work on both countries is like 
expecting a doctor to be top-notch in both trauma surgery and physical therapy. 
Although a regional approach can be helpful, a regional strategy designed for 
maximal impact would have to include Pakistan’s enormous neighbor to the east—
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absence of Greenbook data for the 2010 fiscal year, we have used budget data compiled by the CRS. Go to 
www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1425116 for more information.
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India. Cross-border Indo-Pakistani trade has more potential to spur economic 
growth in Pakistan than practically any intervention in the U.S. arsenal.
2. Name a leader: put one person in charge of the develop-
ment program in Washington and in Islamabad 
The administration needs to clarify who is responsible for the ongoing task of 
shaping and adjusting as circumstances demand the overall development strategy 
(including the approach to trade and investment), and who is responsible for 
implementation of aid programs. 
The contrast between the currently muddled accountability in the United States 
vis-à-vis development in Pakistan and the clear accountability in the United 
Kingdom of the cabinet member responsible for the Department of International 
Development (DfiD) is notable. The broad outlines of the Df ID program are 
closely coordinated with the UK Foreign Office (the counterpart to the U.S. State 
Department) but Df ID has more autonomy and its secretary of state more inde-
pendent standing in the British cabinet (see box next page). 
We recommend that the USAID administrator be responsible to the U.S. 
president—through the secretary of state—for the planning and execution of a 
development strategy in Pakistan.25 He and his staff should collaborate with staff 
in the Office of the Special Representative (as is the case now), but they should be 
ultimately accountable for making decisions regarding the content of the program 
and its execution. In Pakistan, the USAID mission director should be fully account-
able to the USAID administrator for execution of the program. He and his staff 
should inform the ongoing shaping of strategy in Washington through feedback on 
implementation issues and implications for medium-term strategy. 
To some extent, lines of responsibility are confused because the United States is 
pursuing multiple legitimate objectives. It could help to separate the money spent 
primarily for long-term development from money spent primarily for diplomatic 
reasons (e.g., to maintain key relationships) or to benefit short-term stability 
(e.g., keeping the lights on in a restive urban area). There is space in the U.S. 
budget for projects that are chosen because they matter to a key contact in the 
Pakistani civilian government or even in the Pakistani military. However, if these 
sorts of projects are to be undertaken, they should be set apart from the projects 
that are chosen on the basis of their potential medium- and long-term develop-
ment impacts. Projects chosen primarily for reasons other than their potential 
development impact are more likely to fall short if they are judged against stan-
25. We hesitate to make a specific recommendation regarding responsibility for trade and investment. In 
the long run, it would be better if USAID had far more responsibility for policies in these areas that would spur 
development. At the moment, however, we see the benefits of the White House taking leadership on better 
access for Pakistan to the U.S. market, with input from USAID. On investment, USAID or OPIC should be 
responsible, with the other collaborating.
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A Different Approach: The British Model
The British Department for International Development (DfID) approach is an 
alternative to the integrated U.S. approach to development policy in Pakistan. 
The mandate, priorities, and organizational structure of the British develop-
ment program stand in stark contrast to the USAID model. There are, of course, 
important differences in the roles played by the United States and the United 
Kingdom in Pakistan. In sheer size, the U.S. assistance program is over two and 
a half times larger (not including significant military assistance and reimburse-
ments). The United States’ role as the world’s superpower and lead coalition 
partner in Afghanistan creates additional short-term pressures that affect its 
ability to plan a strictly long-term focused development program. Nevertheless, 
certain ingredients of the DfID model could inform the United States’ own ef-
forts to improve its development program—both to achieve development results 
and, perhaps counterintuitively, to reap the strategic benefits of public goodwill.
Development is the goal: Policymakers in the United Kingdom have made 
clear that the primary objective of DfID’s program in Pakistan and throughout 
the world is poverty reduction because that is in Britain’s long-term national 
interest. The result has been is a clear and unambiguous focus on long-term 
development which has enabled the DfID program to avoid the skepticism that 
many Pakistanis have of the motives of the U.S. program.
Clear objectives: As part of a comprehensive review of British development 
programs, DfID has defined specific targets for the results it aims to achieve 
in each aid-recipient country. During a recent visit to Pakistan, Prime Minister 
Cameron announced two of the targets for the UK program there: to put 4 
million additional children through primary school and to increase the annual 
volume of exports from Pakistan to the United Kingdom by 600 million pounds. 
In setting clear, measurable targets, DfID creates a clear, compelling narrative 
through which Pakistani and British citizens can easily understand the purpose 
and priorities of the aid program and assess whether it is on track.
Empowered leadership: The United Kingdom structures its development 
agency differently than the United States does. DfID is a cabinet-level agency 
with broad authority over long-term development policy—not just aid imple-
mentation. It can, for example, recommend trade policies that complement its 
overall development mission and manage relationships with the multilateral 
development institutions. It is the secretary of state for international develop-
ment, not the foreign secretary, who represents the UK’s development program 
in Pakistan. This sends a signal consistent with DfID’s primary mission of poverty 
reduction. As a cabinet-level agency, it is well positioned to represent develop-
ment concerns in broader foreign policy discussions.
(continued)
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dard development metrics—even if they meet their diplomatic objectives. Thus, 
USAID, an agency highly sensitive to the potential effects of even one negative 
audit, worries about including such projects in its regular portfolio.
A clearly delineated stability budget could be programmed and evaluated on the 
basis of more appropriate short-term stability goals. Since the stability mission has 
a strong diplomatic component, it might make sense for the State Department’s 
coordinator for economic assistance to exercise primary control over this money, 
leaving the rest of the budget for the USAID mission director to spend based on 
interventions designed for development impact.
3. Say what you are doing: set up a website with regularly 
updated data on U.S. aid commitments and disbursements in 
Pakistan by project, place, and recipient
Despite widespread agreement from State Department and USAID leaders on the 
benefits of transparency, their program still remains far too opaque. The admin-
istration should be much more transparent about the U.S. development program 
by sharing more complete and timely information about plans, commitments, and 
actual disbursements than we have seen up to now. USAID traditionally follows 
an approach to transparency that emphasizes success stories. We do not think that 
approach is sufficient. What matters most is providing the facts.
The USAID-Pakistan website should offer up-to-date information on spending 
plans and, critically, on aid disbursements. It should list all the projects funded 
by American assistance, ideally in a way that is sortable by geographic area or 
by implementing partner. There are, to be sure, certain security concerns with 
information sharing in Pakistan, especially as it affects the ability of implementing 
(continued)
Staffing for success: Especially in conflict-affected states such as Pakistan, 
DfID has increased the number and seniority of local national staff. This is part 
of an intentional, worldwide shift that by 2010 increased the number of senior, 
representational-level staff hired locally to 132 worldwide (12 percent of such 
positions in all).* In Pakistan, the head of DfID’s economic growth program is 
a well-respected Pakistani who was previously the executive director of Paki-
stan’s Securities and Exchange Commission. The DfID mission has also sought to 
involve private Pakistani experts and members of the business community in its 
work by, for example, appointing a public-private board of directors for a major 
skills development fund in Punjab province.
*Data are from DfID, “DfID Staffing by Grade and Location at 31 March 2010,” available at www.publi-
cations.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmintdev/605/605we03.htm.
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partners to operate in the dangerous tribal regions, but to date not even compre-
hensive public and unclassified material is available on the USAID website. 
USAID took a significant step last year with the rollout of the Foreign Assistance 
Dashboard.26 As USAID expands and improves the site, it should make quickly 
addressing the enormous gaps in information in the Pakistan aid program a top 
priority. As this information is made available, a robust strategic communications 
strategy should be implemented to publicize and explain the development program 
to stakeholders in Pakistan and those beyond. For aid effectiveness, public diplo-
macy, and relations with Capitol Hill appropriators, transparency about where the 
money is going is indispensable.
4. Staff the USAID mission for success 
To effectively implement the administration’s development program for Pakistan, 
the USAID mission needs staff that have Pakistan experience and expertise and 
sufficiently long tenures to develop relationships with their Pakistani counterparts. 
To develop this human resource capital within USAID, we recommend creating 
a formal long-term rotation of five years for USAID officers in Pakistan, similar 
in philosophy if not in all details to the Pentagon’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands 
program.27 The five-year assignment could be split into three separate 18-month 
tours—two in the field, one at headquarters—and would include significant local 
language and cultural training. 
The mission should also take steps to recruit, retain, and promote highly qualified 
local staff in Pakistan. One of the strengths of Pakistan is its large cadre of smart, 
educated, technical professionals. These professionals offer deep experience in the 
country and could forge the long-term relationships necessary to work directly 
with Pakistani institutions. They also might be less affected by worsening security 
conditions. However, top-notch Pakistanis are unlikely to be attracted by posi-
tions in which they are necessarily limited in their career tracks and often required 
to report to far less-experienced American staff. The mission should be granted 
greater flexibility to hire foreign national staff at senior levels, with attractive sala-
ries and training opportunities. It could also tap into the large and highly skilled 
Pakistani-American diaspora population. A mechanism similar to the UNDP’s 
TOKTEN28 program could allow motivated members of the diaspora to donate 
their expertise to Pakistani government institutions or nongovernmental organiza-
tions or even to serve in a field office of the USAID mission.
26. See www.foreignassistance.gov.  
27. A description of the Pentagon’s program can be found in Karen Parrish, “Af Pak Hands’ Strive for 
Cultural Awareness,” American Forces Press Service, March 3, 2011, www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.
aspx?id=63019. 
28. Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals. The program, initiated in 1977, places expert 
volunteers in training and advisory positions in their country of origin for a limited period of time.
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USAID has worked to decentralize its operations in Pakistan, setting up offices 
in the provincial capitals of Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar. This new structure 
will allow USAID to work more directly with provincial governments, especially 
important as Pakistan’s own process of devolution continues. It is critical that these 
working relationships include policy dialogue on key economic and social reforms. 
State Department diplomats will also play a role in this process, but the bureau-
cratic division between policy dialogue and program design and implementation 
must be closed.
Staff closest to the implementation of programs, including those in the field 
offices, should have opportunities to share feedback on what is working and what 
is not and on the viewpoints of government officials and citizens in Pakistan. 
They should also have channels to offer recommendations on policy and strategy. 
Otherwise, the healthy process of adjusting to changing realities on the ground is 
thwarted, or at least made too dependent on informal communication and good 
personal relationships between the staffs of USAID and the State Department. 
5. Measure what matters: Pakistan’s development progress
Currently, the indicator that draws the most attention in Pakistan and in the 
United States is how much aid money the United States has spent. For a strategy 
intended to promote long-term development, this is a terrible metric of success in 
two respects. It focuses on money, not impact, and on the accomplishments of the 
United States instead of Pakistan’s own progress. The direct U.S. contribution to 
development in Pakistan will necessarily be relatively minor, but it should catalyze 
more significant progress by Pakistanis.
Indicators of progress in Pakistan such as childhood vaccination rates, electricity 
paid for and delivered, and development spending funded through domestic 
revenue are not direct outputs of U.S. aid.29 They are however, better signals of 
whether development in Pakistan is progressing than are the outputs of U.S. aid 
projects. We suggest that the U.S. and Pakistani governments agree on a limited 
set of such indicators reflecting a shared view of what development outcomes can 
be and ought to be pursued in Pakistan over the next five years. This process of 
defining goals and indicators would fit well within the overall effort to encourage 
joint U.S.-Pakistani ownership over development programs. Once these indicators 
have been selected, the two governments or an independent third party should 
report on progress against them at least once a year. 
This is, admittedly, a radical departure from how most aid programs are evaluated. 
However, a development strategy that is clearly based on more than the direct 
29. These are merely illustrative examples—real indicators must be the result of negotiations between the 
Pakistani and U.S. governments. For a full discussion of what sorts of indicators could be appropriate see Nancy 
Birdsall and Wren Elhai, “Shared Goals: Measuring Overall Development Progress in Pakistan,” CGD Essay 
(Washington: Center for Global Development, 2011), www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424744/. 
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outputs of aid projects should be assessed likewise. Doing so in a public way would 
focus attention in the United States and in Pakistan on whether development 
in Pakistan is on the right track and would be an important symbol of the U.S.-
Pakistani development partnership. The periodic progress reports could form an 
important piece of a revamped communications strategy (complementing the basic 
transparency we advocate above in recommendation 3). More tangibly, the infor-
mation produced could be a key resource for the Pakistani people, giving them 
the evidence they need to hold their government accountable for delivering public 
services.
Measuring how much 
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III.What: Recommendations for 
Aid and Beyond
We have addressed why having a development strategy in Pakistan makes sense 
for the United States. We have addressed how this strategy could be designed and 
implemented. But what elements should the strategy include? 
The strategy should build on what the United States can do well, taking into 
account what other allies of Pakistan are doing. With respect to aid, the United 
States should recognize what other donors and multilateral creditors are able and 
willing to finance.
The United States cannot solve Pakistan’s development challenges alone. It  will 
be more effective if it is able to be selective in where it intervenes—choosing what 
not to do as well as what to do. We do not offer an overall roadmap for Pakistan’s 
development, but merely a set of recommendations for focusing American policy 
to support Pakistan’s own efforts in that direction.30 
The United States has many objectives in Pakistan not fundamentally related 
to the mission of long-term development, including some such objectives that 
can be furthered with economic aid. Immediate flood reconstruction assistance, 
humanitarian assistance to refugees, quick-impact projects intended to extend the 
legitimate authority of the Pakistani state, and some spending to catalyze economic 
activity in war-affected regions fall into this category. However, this assistance is 
best described as stabilization assistance, not development assistance. It should be 
held to a different standard, and its effectiveness (including any development costs 
or benefits) should be assessed separately.  
Cognizant that aid policy is only one piece of any development strategy, we do 
not limit our recommendations to how to spend the large U.S. assistance budget, 
although some ideas for smart aid investments are collected in the box on page 35. 
30. Other documents do tackle the broader question of how Pakistan can improve its own economy. See, 
for example, the Planning Commission of Pakistan’s new growth strategy, “Pakistan: Framework for Economic 
Growth,” available at www.planningcommission.gov.pk/nda/index.htm, and the Asia Society’s recent report, 
“Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future,”  available at www.asiasociety.org/policy-politics/
task-forces/pakistan-2020-vision-building-better-future.
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Support private-sector development through trade 
and investment
While effective aid is essential for strengthening public sector institutions in 
Pakistan, a strong private sector will play a far greater role in Pakistan’s transi-
tion toward prosperity and stability. Measures that help to build a strong, vibrant 
private sector will create jobs and help to reduce poverty in Pakistan. Moreover, 
such measures can do so quickly because they are less constrained by the slow 
process of economic and political reform that is needed for aid spending to be 
most effective, especially when spent through the Pakistani government. A robust 
private sector able to pay taxes (and thus provide domestic support for develop-
ment spending) is also a fundamental part of the process of transformation that 
will lead to a healthier Pakistani state. Thus, our first and second recommendations 
are for steps the United States could take—none expensive in dollar terms—to 
unleash the potential of Pakistan’s private sector.
1. Let Pakistani products compete in U.S. markets
It is time for the United States to leverage what is arguably the single most 
powerful and inexpensive tool in the U.S. policy arsenal for promoting economic 
growth and job creation in Pakistan: fully opening U.S. markets to Pakistan’s 
exports. Domestic politics often delay or derail this type of trade legislation. But 
assuming congressional approval of the currently pending trade agreements with 
South Korea, Colombia, and Panama, the administration will have an opening 
to reopen the question of tariff reform for Pakistan. Both to enhance the United 
States’ long-term security and to signal the enduring American commitment to 
Pakistan, Congress and the administration should work together to develop and 
pass legislation for duty-free, quota-free access to U.S. markets for all Pakistani 
exports from all of Pakistan for at least the next five years. 
Bills were introduced in the last Congress to allow duty-free export of certain 
goods produced along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. While the idea of 
promoting development in these underdeveloped regions is sound, the limited 
approach proposed would not achieve that goal. The proposed “Reconstruction 
Opportunity Zones” would at best be a token gesture that would be well received 
in Pakistan; at worst, they risk having little (if any) economic impact and creating 
expectations that cannot be met. 
Expanding the product and geographic coverage of the existing Reconstruction 
Opportunity Zones proposal would encourage product diversification and expand 
the potential development dividend from trade, while having only a negligible 
impact on U.S. producers.31 If the Obama administration and Congressional 
31. Kimberly Ann Elliott, “Getting Real on Trade with Pakistan: Duty-Free Market Access as Development 
Policy,” CGD Working Paper 241 (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2011), www.cgdev.org/
content/publications/detail/1424821/. 
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The Pakistan trade opportunity 
Trade with Pakistan constitutes a tiny fraction of overall U.S. imports, especially 
in contrast to how important Pakistan’s stability and development is for U.S. 
national security interests. U.S. trade tariffs discriminate against poor countries 
that are, like Pakistan, dependent on labor-intensive, light-manufactured ex-
ports. They leave significant room to expand opportunities for Pakistani firms.
The problem and opportunity can be summarized in a few bilateral trade sta-
tistics. The data presented below are generally for 2008, avoiding the volatility 
caused by the global economic crisis.
The textile and apparel industries in Pakistan, including production and pro-
cessing of cotton, account for much of the Pakistani economy:
 — 60 percent of exports (average for 1990–2005)
 — roughly half of total manufacturing output
 — more than a third of industrial employment
 — over 10 percent of gross domestic product
Pakistan’s exports to the United States are concentrated in just a few vul-
nerable sectors. In 2008, they were just 0.2 percent of total U.S. imports. Of 
that, 85 percent were textiles and apparel; together they accounted for 3.7 
percent of U.S. textile and apparel imports. These exports, which had been ris-
ing steadily, stalled after the global system of quotas was eliminated in 2005. 
Despite their size, Pakistan’s exports face substantial discrimination in the U.S. 
market:
 — Overall, 87 percent faced import duties, compared to just 30 percent of 
total U.S. imports.
 — Because those items also fall in higher-than-average tariff categories, the 
average duty rate of 11.4 percent imposed on imports from Pakistan was 
nearly three times the average for all dutiable U.S. imports and 10 times 
the average rate for all imports (including normally duty-free products).
 — The average tariff on Pakistani apparel exports, at 14.9 percent, is almost 
twice as high as the 8 percent average tariff on textile exports. (The pro-
posals for Reconstruction Opportunity Zones would include many textile 
products but exclude most of the more highly protected apparel sector).
(continued)
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(continued)
 — Pakistan gains very little from existing trade preference programs. Only 5 
percent of its exports to the United States benefit from the Generalized 
System of Preferences.
Lowering tariffs on Pakistan’s exports would greatly benefit Pakistan and 
have minimal effects on U.S. producers and Western trading partners.
 — Removing all trade restrictions between the United States and Pakistan 
(assuming full implementation of CAFTA-DR and NAFTA) would increase 
Pakistan’s textile and apparel exports by one-third and one-half.
 — Increased Pakistani exports would displace Chinese or other Asian ex-
ports, not U.S. production. Under the scenario described above, Central 
American exports would increase and Mexico’s would remain steady.
Adapted from Kimberly Ann Elliott, “Getting Real on Trade with Pakistan: Duty-Free Market Access as 
Development Policy,” CGD Working Paper 241 (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2011), 
www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424821/
leaders are serious about promoting U.S. national security interests through 
economic progress in Pakistan, they should be prepared to push hard for some-
thing that will actually make a difference. Expanded trade access for all Pakistani 
exports from all of Pakistan is the best way to ensure a meaningful economic boost 
in Pakistan—with little cost to American taxpayers, and very little harm to workers 
in the United States.32
2. Actively encourage domestic and foreign private investment 
While the United States has tried to help Pakistan with increased flows of aid, there 
are at least three other ways in which the United States has an economic effect on 
Pakistan. Pakistani nationals in the United States send remittances to family back 
home in Pakistan. Pakistani companies export goods and services to the American 
market. And American firms invest in business opportunities in Pakistan. All of 
these three channels have the potential to equal or exceed aid’s impact on jobs and 
economic growth in Pakistan (see chart). Over the past two years, however, the 
full potential of these private flows has not been realized. U.S. direct investment in 
Pakistan especially has suffered a precipitous decline, falling by nearly two-thirds 
from 2008 to 2010.33 Portfolio investment has slowed as well. This is through no 
conscious policy decision. The global economic crisis combined with the three 
32. Ibid. Elliott and Decker find that Pakistan’s exports would compete primarily with other South and East 
Asian trading partners.
33. State Bank of Pakistan statistics, “Net Inflow Of Foreign Private Investment- Country-wise (New 
Format),” spreadsheet data, available at http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/NIFP_Arch/index.asp. 
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instabilities (security, economic, and political) have simply made Pakistan a riskier 
place to do business. Moreover, the continued failure of the Pakistani govern-
ment to deal with outstanding policy issues, such as pricing and governance in the 
energy sector, saps investor confidence.
While those factors are outside U.S. control, the United States can act to blunt 
the worst of the risk facing companies that might be willing to invest in Pakistan. 
To use limited public resources to leverage greater private investment, the United 
States could increase the credit subsidy funding available to the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation. OPIC could use these resources to establish a facility to 
provide new creative forms of risk insurance in Pakistan, and could increase the 
availability of credit for small and medium enterprises and would-be homeowners. 
Meanwhile, a group of U.S. senators including John Kerry and Richard Lugar has 
proposed that $60 million per year be invested through a new Pakistani-American 
Enterprise Fund to provide financial and technical assistance for private firms 
in Pakistan. Importantly, that fund would be administered by a private board, 
including prominent and respected Pakistani business leaders.34
34. The text of the Senate proposal for an Enterprise Fund is available at www.opencongress.org/
bill/111-s3665/text. 
 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan Economic Data, www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/index2.asp#external.  
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Finally, diplomatic efforts could pursue measures designed to restore investor 
confidence. Helping private creditors and portfolio managers establish dialogue 
with Pakistani leaders in government and in the business community could help 
direct investment and portfolio investment recover.
Target aid for long-term impact
We recognize that if Pakistan were an equally poor but less strategically important 
country, far less aid and attention would be devoted to supporting development 
there. Aid is not easy to do well in Pakistan, and done badly it could be counterpro-
ductive. Our three recommendations on aid take into account the difficult nature 
of the challenge, and the inherent risks involved.
3. Beware the unintended consequences of aid
As Senator Richard Lugar has noted, “Rushing aid and accelerating programming 
could inhibit our goals of helping Pakistan achieve a more stable and productive 
economic situation.”35 In other words, patience matters not only for ensuring 
that aid has the greatest positive impact, but also for decreasing the chance that 
aid spending will be counterproductive. Unfortunately and inevitably, the United 
States’ desire to make quick progress (including on the diplomatic and security 
fronts)—and the perception that American aid has produced few visible benefits in 
the past two years—creates strong pressure for hasty disbursement. That pressure 
must be resisted.
Indiscriminate aid spending can do harm in at least three ways. First, spending 
limited aid resources on programs or projects that are not likely to be effective 
or sustainable has an opportunity cost. Such spending crowds out more effective 
projects. To the extent that the aid program can affect public opinion in Pakistan, 
reports of aid money going to waste can only further sour perceptions of the 
United States.
Second, aid can directly fuel corruption and create new flashpoints for conflict. 
That is especially a risk in the most insecure regions of Pakistan. Evidence from 
Afghanistan suggests that the sorts of aid deployed as part of counterinsurgency 
doctrine often enrich local elites while creating resentment among those who are 
not lucky enough to reap the benefits. While aid has not been shown to buy good-
will (studies in Afghanistan found “overwhelmingly negative” perceptions of aid 
among the Afghan people36), it represents a flood of cash, amounting to a signifi-
35. Richard Lugar,  “Opening Statement for Hearing on Nomination for Ambassador to Pakistan,” 
September 23, 2010, available at http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/LugarStatement100923a.pdf. 
36. “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in 
COIN Operations,” Wilton Park Conference WP 1022 (March 2010), www.wiltonpark.org.uk/resources/en/
pdf/22290903/22291297/wp1022-report. 
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cant percentage of local economic activity in targeted districts.37 That amount of 
spending in an environment not conducive to close oversight encourages corrup-
tion (as was observed last year in one of USAID’s largest contracts in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas) and the erosion of local institutions. 
Third, aid spending can, by plugging fiscal and other holes in the short run for 
Pakistan, make it too easy for Pakistan’s own policymakers to put off tough deci-
sions. It also distracts from the policy engagement with which the United States, 
with other donors, hopes to help Pakistan deal with the short-run political and 
economic costs of reforms. In sector after sector, solutions to Pakistan’s most 
pressing problems will come only with action from Pakistani leaders. Mobilizing 
domestic revenues, rationalizing the financing of the energy and water sectors, and 
improving the governance of the civil service are all far more determinative of long-
term success than how American aid is spent. As USAID itself has reported, “if 
fundamental reforms are not implemented, assistance from the United States and 
other donors will have stabilized the economy only temporarily.”38 However, none 
of those reforms is easy—they will come if at all only from a long, halting process 
of negotiations and coalition-building, the necessary, patient work of politics in a 
democratically governed country. 
37. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that, were planned levels of U.S. aid in FATA distributed 
evenly across the tribal areas, they would exceed 10 percent of local GDP. In reality, aid is likely much more 
concentrated, and would represent an even higher percentage of economic activity in targeted villages. 
38. “Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report” (note 15).
Hard lessons from hard donor experience: $1.5 billion in aid does 
not buy U.S. leverage 
The experience of the United States, other bilateral donors, and the interna-
tional financial institutions over many years in many countries suggests that 
outside leverage on domestic policies, even where large sums of money are 
involved, is limited. In Pakistan’s energy sector, for instance, the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank have for decades stressed the need to rationalize 
Pakistan’s energy tariff prices. Time and again, donors cite the same problems 
and recommend the same solutions and  the government of Pakistan promises 
to implement the same reform but fails to make progress on the same promises. 
Likewise, even the heavy-handed, explicit conditionality of the IMF’s $11 billion 
stabilization package has proven inadequate to force through tax reforms that 
have raised the ire of key constituencies in Pakistan. This pattern holds true even 
in countries far more aid dependent than Pakistan is, and even when donors are 
willing to exit the country, a step which for good reasons the United States has 
made clear it will not repeat.
Aid spending can 
make it too easy for 
Pakistan’s own poli-
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By funding Band-Aid fixes that delay outright crisis and make it easier to avoid 
necessary but difficult solutions, even well-implemented aid can delay enduring 
solutions to Pakistan’s most serious problems.39 To the extent that Pakistani leaders 
expect and assume disbursement of aid, it makes sense for them to push for that 
money rather than to work with their political rivals to move on key reforms. 
For these reasons, we recommend that much of the $7.5 billion Kerry-Lugar-
Berman aid package not be disbursed immediately. Especially in sectors where 
serious flaws in public administration are the binding constraints to success, it 
would be better to backload the bulk of this extraordinary aid investment, to wait 
until critical policy questions are resolved. This caution is most advisable in sectors 
where the United States has committed to disbursing its aid funding primarily 
through government channels.
So-called conditionality in aid spending is an extremely sensitive subject, carrying 
the implication that donors are using the threat of withholding aid as a stick to 
force their desired outcomes in Pakistani political debates. That is not the intent 
of our proposal. In fact, we are highly cognizant of the fact that aid does not buy 
leverage over domestic policies—even if that were its aim. Rather, we believe 
that the pure act of delaying disbursement in certain sectors will benefit both the 
Pakistani reform process and the ultimate effectiveness of U.S. aid. 
Yet if money is left undisbursed, the incentives of the congressional budget process 
could endanger future appropriations of aid. If there are not $1.5 billion worth of 
effective investments in Pakistan this year, given constraints on USAID’s opera-
tions and the state of Pakistan’s political process, then USAID must have ways to 
responsibly delay aid spending. As one possibility, the administration could work 
with Congress to build a fund (at the World Bank, for example) to finance long-
term development programs in Pakistan only when they can be executed well.40 
The United States would continue to supervise the money and retain decision-
making power over how and where to spend the aid resources, but could sequester 
funding that cannot currently be spent well. In the case of energy, for instance, this 
would mean waiting for the process of reforms to governance and pricing to run its 
course. 
There is also an exception to our general note of caution—we believe that, even 
in a sector as difficult as energy, the United States could safely proceed with one 
or two very large, very long-term infrastructure projects without endangering the 
current opportunity for reform. A megaproject like the long-delayed Diamer-Basha 
39. In certain cases, this dynamic is almost inevitable. External resources that lessen the severity of Pakistan’s 
fiscal crisis likely delay the day when tax collection and tax policy will finally be reformed. 
40. Possible models already exist in the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and in the Pakistan 
Multidonor Trust Fund for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, and Balochistan. Details of governance and structure 
would have to be examined for this particular context.
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dam will take an estimated seven to ten years to be completed. In that period of 
time, Pakistani advocates for a better-governed, better-performing energy sector 
can be afforded the space they need to finally secure the common-sense reforms 
that have eluded Pakistan for decades. 
4. Finance what is already working
As a rule of thumb, the United States should spend more of its aid where progress is 
already being made—not where it continues to be elusive. Spending in sectors where 
a stalled reform process is a binding constraint can harm the long-term development 
mission, distracting from and delaying the policy changes needed to put Pakistan’s 
economy on a sturdier foundation. By identifying geographic areas and sectors where 
political obstacles have already been addressed and public constituencies are mobilized, 
the United States will maximize the development impact of its aid budget. Doing so 
would also amplify the good work of independent Pakistani champions of change. 
Thus, payment for progress makes both development sense and political sense.
Cofinance successful programs with other donors
To pay for things that are working well, we suggest that the United States be much 
more open to cofinancing projects with other bilateral and multilateral donors. 
In the education sector, for example, the World Bank and Df ID have programs in 
Punjab and Sindh provinces that are delivering results.41 Additional resources for 
these programs from the United States could produce significant benefits, with 
no need for USAID to duplicate work others have already done well. The United 
States has partnered with Df ID to advance the work of the Pakistan Education 
Task Force, an independent group that features prominent members from 
Pakistan’s government and civil society. It should seize this opportunity to further 
the movement for education reform by putting significant resources into the 
special fund the task force has created to fund innovations in education.
Pay for verified outcomes
U.S. agreements with the Pakistani government for payment for performance 
could also be much more literal. Increasingly, the United States uses Fixed Amount 
Reimbursement contracts to ensure that aid for small-scale infrastructure proj-
ects is disbursed only for projects that are completed satisfactorily. That idea can 
be extended to pay for outcomes in the education, health, water, and agricultural 
sectors. We believe a pilot of Cash on Delivery Aid for education—paying a 
provincial government for verified, incremental progress against a mutually agreed-
upon development indicator—makes sense in Pakistan. 
For example, a provincial government would receive initial support to roll out 
universal student testing. Then, the United States might pay $100 for each additional 
41. See for example the implementation status report and project paper for the World Bank’s Punjab 
Education Sector Project, available at http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&
piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P102608.  
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child above a baseline who completes primary school—public or private—and takes 
the standardized test of learning. In short, if the provincial government or district 
governments are willing and able to find ways to improve their overall primary educa-
tion system, they would be rewarded with additional unrestricted cash.42 
The money made available through a Cash on Delivery contract could put an 
important lever into the hands of reform-minded officials in the Pakistani govern-
ment. It would promote local ownership by requiring the recipient to assume full 
responsibility for the design and implementation of strategies, without conditions 
or restrictions on how funds can be used. It would help donors and recipients alike 
place greater emphasis on measuring development outcomes and learning from 
both successes and failures. It reduces the administrative burden on both parties 
in an aid transaction, and offers a clear way to summarize for citizens in donor and 
recipient countries the progress aid is helping to achieve.
5. Support and engage with Pakistan’s reformers
While the United States cannot buy political outcomes in Pakistan, it can play a 
catalytic role to make the very difficult politics of reform slightly easier. To do so, 
the United States must work to empower those in Pakistan who are their country’s 
most powerful champions of change. 
The United States’ engagement with Pakistan has been impressive. However, the 
useful start U.S. diplomats have made building government-to-government ties 
should be expanded to what one Pakistani with long experience in and out of 
government calls “stakeholder-to-stakeholder” engagement. The United States can 
help by making sure that advocates for reform are included in negotiations with 
government and by advocating for the democratic tools—access to information, 
freedoms of assembly and speech—that can sustain reform constituencies. 
As another means of engaging with nongovernmental stakeholders, the United 
States should offer Pakistanis ways to comment on and shape the direction of the 
U.S. development program. Partly, this involves the sort of transparency described 
in section II of this report. Keeping natural allies in the dark about what the 
United States is doing in Pakistan is an unforced error of the greatest magnitude. 
Beyond this, however, U.S. staff on the ground in Pakistan should reach out to 
well-informed and well-respected Pakistanis—and seek ways to insulate these 
relationships against the inevitable shocks of staff turnover. As one example, the 
USAID mission director could regularly convene an advisory board of Pakistanis 
from a variety of fields. Such a group would offer a valuable perspective and could 
42. This proposal is explored in greater detail in Wren Elhai, “The Challenge of Aid in Pakistan: Is Cash on 
Delivery Part of the Solution?” CGD Brief (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2011), www.cgdev.
org/content/publications/detail/1424685/. For the general case, see also Nancy Birdsall and William Savedoff, 
Cash on Delivery: A New Approach to Foreign Aid (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2010). 
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A possible portfolio of good investments
We have stressed that aid spending alone cannot constitute a development 
strategy. However, it is important for the United States to carefully consider how 
it allocates its scarce aid resources. Below is a sample portfolio of aid invest-
ments that takes advantage of U.S. strengths, avoids the worst risks of doing 
harm, and promotes a more functional, democratic political process in Pakistan. 
It is intended to balance the many different U.S. objectives in Pakistan while 
maintaining a long-term development focus. Though no U.S. program can solve 
Pakistan’s economic woes alone, these investments could make a difference. 
Several of these investments are included in USAID’s current portfolio.
1. Support one or two major, long-term infrastructure projects. In general, 
we are wary of putting money into Pakistan’s energy sector at this time. 
Even well-implemented short-term investments could be harmful in the 
long-term by blunting the pressure for fundamental reform of the sector. 
However, a major investment in a large hydropower project, such as the 
one planned at Diamer-Basha, may avoid these risks. It also has features 
which are valuable in their own right: it would involve a healthy degree of 
collaboration with private-sector partners and would take advantage of 
American expertise in engineering and finance. Moreover, it would be a 
highly visible symbol of the United States’ long-term commitment to Paki-
stan—something many policymakers in the U.S. and Pakistan have been 
eager to see. A similar argument could be made for the financing of a road 
or rail link from the port city of Gwadar in Balochistan.
2. Cofinance innovations in education. Other donors have made considerable 
progress in education in recent years, including on securing buy-in from 
provincial governments for reform. Targeted investments in Pakistan’s 
education sector that build on the promising reform efforts already un-
derway are a way for the United States to add to the success. In Pakistan, 
the best way for the United States to support education is to cofinance 
and extend the reach of the good work of the World Bank and DfID. For 
example, the United States should give a significant amount (at least $50 
million) to a new innovation fund administered by the U.S.-UK-Pakistan 
Education Task Force. 
3. Make health or agriculture a signature priority. Those in charge of the 
U.S. development program could consider choosing either health or agri-
culture as a key priority, taking advantage of the technical expertise and 
focus that USAID already has in those sectors. The Obama administration 
launched two global initiatives focused on specific development sectors. 
The Global Health Initiative targets eight priority countries for focused at-
tention on collaborative planning and impact evaluation.
(continued)
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help to communicate a development strategy to a broader swath of Pakistani 
society.
At a less visible level, the United States should support the unglamorous but 
important projects that maintain the machinery of Pakistan’s democracy. 
Providing, for example, financial and technical support to conduct a technically 
sound and transparent national census could yield benefits down the road by 
producing a more representative balance of political power.
As the process of devolution moves forward, the United States could offer tech-
nical support to provincial governments requesting help fulfilling their new 
administrative responsibilities. The United States could also provide funding 
to support high-quality, independent policy research in Pakistan’s universities 
and think tanks and should build local capacity to conduct public opinion polls, 
understand and analyze government budgets, and communicate with members 
of parliament. 43 The aim would be to create the sort of scrutiny of the process of 
government that encourages better policy in Washington. 
43. The multidonor Think Tank Initiative, administered by the International Development Research 
Center, already provides core grants to think tanks in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia—including two in 
Pakistan. U.S. funding for the initiative could be earmarked to expand support for Pakistani institutions. More 
information on the Think Tank Initiative is available at http://publicwebsite.idrc.ca/EN/Programs/Social_
and_Economic_Policy/Think_Tank_Initiative/Pages/default.aspx. 
(continued)
The Feed the Future initiative selects countries for a similarly focused 
attention across the sectors that affect food security. Through these two 
initiatives, the United States is developing significant capacity to imple-
ment sectoral programs in health and in food security. 
4. Fund small-scale upgrades to the machinery of Pakistan’s democracy. Im-
proving the functioning of Pakistan’s democratic system could help cham-
pions of reform make their voices heard. Most of the help the United 
States can provide in this space is low profile and very low cost. Technical 
support for a national census, advisors to support the process of devolu-
tion, and support for independent policy research in Pakistani think tanks 
and universities could all be done well on a tiny fraction of the overall aid 
budget—$30 million would be just 2 percent of the 2010 appropriation. 
For many years, support for universities in Pakistan and scholarships for 
Pakistanis to study in the United States have been just such a long-term 
investment mechanism for the United States. The Fulbright scholarship 
program in Pakistan is over 60 years old and accepts more applicants 
than any other Fulbright program in the world.
The USAID mission 
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IV. Conclusions
The U.S. development program to this point has been a victim of its designers’ 
ambitions. The relevant decision makers agree that the United States’ relationship 
with Pakistan should go beyond military aid and covert operations, and the $7.5 
billion Enhanced Partnership aid package was born from that consensus. However, 
the focus on the new aid package has not extended to the trade and investment 
opportunities the United States could provide to create jobs and enhance growth 
in Pakistan. And the high hopes for the aid package have raised unrealistic expec-
tations, generated multiple conflicting objectives, and inspired competing lines 
of authority. This toxic combination has made what would be a difficult mission 
under any circumstances nearly impossible. 
Some of the constraints on the U.S. program in Pakistan are symptomatic of 
broader flaws in the way the United States executes development policy around the 
world. The Obama administration has defined a new approach, emphasizing the 
logic of country ownership and the utility of tools beyond aid. But who is respon-
sible for implementing development policy and programs, particularly in weak 
but strategically important states like Pakistan, is far from clear. The integration 
of diplomacy and development led by the State Department that makes sense on 
paper has not yet produced a clear mission or effective implementation in Pakistan. 
Within USAID, the overhaul of procurement and the new focus on innovation, 
learning, and systematic evaluation of outcomes and impact is impressive, but it 
will take time to take hold at the level of country programs. And it will not in itself 
relieve the heavy burden of oversight under which USAID operates. This burden, 
which has accumulated over several decades, slows operations and reduces incen-
tives to take reasonable risks.44 
Still, within those larger constraints, we believe the U.S. development strategy in 
Pakistan can be greatly improved—and that now is the time to do so. 
The necessary solution can be summarized as a bureaucratic bargain. The 
Obama administration must much more clearly describe what its development 
program intends to accomplish in Pakistan and how it will be measured. It must 
make this information clear to American staff in Washington and Pakistan and 
clarify who is responsible for leadership on trade and investment options and 
designing and implementing an aid program to deliver results. If this can be 
accomplished, Congress and top administration officials should give USAID and 
State Department staff space to carry out their missions. With respect to aid, a 
strong, unambiguous statement of purpose and a commitment to transparency is a 
prerequisite for earning the trust of Congress and of Pakistanis. The more trust the 
44. Andrew Natsios, “Clash of the Counter-bureaucracy” (note 20).
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foundations of U.S. strategy inspire, the more that strategy can expect and deserve 
to be spared from the politicization and micromanagement that have bedeviled the 
program in Pakistan to this point. 
If that bargain can be secured, we believe it is not too late for the United States to 
make a meaningful contribution to Pakistan’s development. The process will take 
time and will be guided first and last by Pakistanis themselves. However, American 
policies can help—at relatively minimal cost given the importance of Pakistan’s 
success to the United States. To do so, however, a strategy must be in place to 
structure and manage these policies to reach their full potential. 
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Appendix A. Background and Objectives of the CGD 
Study Group on a U.S. Development Strategy
In early 2010, the Center for Global Development convened the Study Group on a 
U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan. Chaired by CGD president Nancy Birdsall, 
the study group includes experts in aid effectiveness, development economics, and 
national security, several of whom are themselves Pakistani.
The objective of the study group is to offer practical and timely recommenda-
tions to U.S. policymakers on the effective deployment of foreign assistance and, 
more broadly, other non-aid instruments for achieving sustainable development 
in Pakistan. The group has drawn on the work of recent task forces and commis-
sions that have examined U.S. relations with Pakistan. Such efforts have taken into 
account security, military, and regional issues but have often paid little attention to 
development assistance. The CGD study group’s work complements these efforts 
by focusing specifically on development policy in Pakistan and by drawing lessons 
from the vexing challenges that donors have faced in Pakistan over the past several 
decades.
The study group has met seven times since February 2010 to discuss specific ques-
tions about development in Pakistan, including the administration’s assistance 
strategy, challenges of effective deployment of assistance in Pakistan’s FATA region, 
Pakistan’s energy and water crises, aid to the education sector, and a U.S. response 
to the 2010 floods. 
Drawing on the recommendations and ideas from the study group discussions, 
Nancy Birdsall authored a series of five open letters to Ambassador Richard 
Holbrooke, the State Department’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The letters, available through CGD’s website, have provided the basis of 
our ongoing dialogue and consultations with U.S. officials in the State Department, 
USAID, the White House, and Congress. To reach a broad audience, the Center 
published the letters on CGD’s website and disseminated them to relevant stake-
holders, including members of the press and those in the policy and research 
communities. 
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Appendix B. Additional CGD Publications and 
Resources on Pakistan
“Beyond Short-Term Thinking: How to Spend Billions Well in Pakistan, for Them 
and for Us” by Nancy Birdsall, Wren Elhai and Molly Kinder (CGD Essay, 2010), 
www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424399.
 “The U.S. Aid ‘Surge’ to Pakistan: Repeating a Failed Experiment? Lessons for U.S. 
Policymakers from the World Bank’s Social Sector Lending in the 1990s” by Nancy 
Birdsall and Molly Kinder (CGD Working Paper 205), www.cgdev.org/content/
publications/detail/1423965. 
“Stimulating Pakistani Exports and Job Creation: Special Zones Won’t Help Nearly 
as Much as Cutting Tariffs across the Board” by Kimberly Ann Elliott (CGD Note, 
2010), www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424056/. 
“Getting Real on Trade with Pakistan: Duty-Free Market Access as Development 
Policy” by Kimberly Ann Elliott (CGD Working Paper 241), www.cgdev.org/
content/publications/detail/1424821.
“Shared Goals: Measuring Overall Development Progress in Pakistan” by 
Nancy Birdsall and Wren Elhai (CGD Essay, 2011), www.cgdev.org/content/
publications/detail/1424744. 
“The Challenge of Aid in Pakistan: Is Cash on Delivery Part of the Solution?“ 
by Wren Elhai (CGD Brief, 2011), www.cgdev.org/content/publications/
detail/1424685/. 
Open Letter #1: “Guidelines for Effective Aid in Pakistan,” March 29, 2010, 
www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424036. 
Open Letter #2: “U.S. Development Assistance to the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas,” May 3, 2010, www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424103. 
Open Letter #3: “U.S. Development Assistance to Pakistan’s Energy Sector,” May 
25, 2010, www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424170/. 
Open Letter #4: “Adequate Staffing of the Development Assistance Program in 
Pakistan,” June 23, 2010, www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424249. 
Open Letter #5: “U.S. Development Assistance to Pakistan’s Education Sector,” 
September 28, 2010, www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424466.
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